Abstract: EU Member countries have shown different degrees of ambition to reach a budget position of "close to balance or in surplus". Differences in ambition can only partly be explained by the relative size of cyclical safety margins or differences in the number of votes in the ECOFIN Council. It is also shown that in the medium run there is no evidence for a trade-off between budget consolidation and growth. Of the eight countries with the strongest reduction of structural budget deficits in the period 1992-2001, only one showed growth rates below the EU average. The other seven countries even managed to achieve higher growth rates than in the period 1974-91 during which structural deficits had increased.
Introduction
The Stability and Growth Pact which was finalised in summer 1997 established a strict framework for fiscal policies in the member countries of the euro area.
The main purpose of the Pact was to reduce risks for the stability of the new European currency that could result from possible inflationary debt-bailouts (Siebert 1997; Eichengreen and Wyplosz 1998) . While the Maastricht-Treaty contains a no-bailout clause, it was questioned whether the ECB could in effect just stand aside if a member country, or several member countries, became in- -5 -Up to now, no member country of the Euro area has been judged to have an excessive deficit, which means that the dissuasive element has not yet been applied. Second, the Pact has a preventive function. To avoid the occurrence of excessive deficits, each member of the Euro area has to submit a stability programme (other EU-members submit a convergence programme). It includes information about the medium-term objective for the budget position, which has to be close to balance or in surplus, and about the adjustment path towards the target. The programmes are updated on an annual basis and monitored by the European Council and the European Commission.
In this paper, we shall take a closer look at budgetary balances in the EU-countries before and after the start of EMU (Part 2). We shall, then, address the question why some countries have so far not succeeded in attaining the medium-run budget objectives; in this context, we shall also deal with the issue of whether there is a trade-off between deficit reduction and growth (Part 3). Finally, we point out some lessons that can be drawn from the operation of the Stability and
Growth Pact in the first years (Part 4). EU -Financial Balances Before and After the Start of EMU
When EMU took off on January 1, 1999 and the Stability and Growth Pact entered fully into force 2 , the member countries of the Euro area could look back to a substantial reduction of the cumulative government deficit from 5.1 per cent of GDP in 1992 (the first year after the signing of the Maastricht Treaty) to 2.2 per cent of GDP in 1998 (Table 1 ). There were, however, also substantial differences among the countries. In Belgium, Finland and Italy the average annual deficit reduction was far above the mean Euro-area rate of 0.5 percentage points. The same holds for Greece, which joined the Euro area in 2001. In contrast, France, Germany, Portugal and Spain only achieved a small deficit reduction as compared to 1992; Austria even recorded a slight increase of the deficit which, however, still remained below the 3 per cent threshold. These differences to some degree may be explained by the different starting positions, i.e.
countries with a relatively high deficit ratio in 1992 reduced their deficits most strongly. While the fiscal convergence criteria of the Maastricht Treaty have been conducive to deficit reduction in these countries, it should be noted that substantial deficit reductions also occurred in the EU-countries which have chosen not to join the Euro area. In fact, the average decline of the deficit ratio in these countries was above that for the Euro area in the period 1992-98; Den--7 -mark, Sweden and the UK all managed to move from a substantial deficit position in 1992 to a surplus in 1998. 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 In order to assess to which extent the reduction in budget deficits can be considered as a structural rather than a cyclical phenomenon, OECD-estimates of structural government balances are presented in Table 2 . For the period 1992-1998 the figures in Table 2 largely correspond to those in Table 1 . They show that the strong reduction of the deficits in Belgium, Greece, Italy and Sweden can be largely ascribed to a substantial cut in the structural budget deficit. In contrast, the improvement of the Finnish budget is dominated by the upswing from the deep recession in the early nineties, while structural budget cuts only played a minor role. 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 (Table 1) . Looking at the structural balances from a country by country perspective there are three countries with a structural deficit of more than 1 per cent: Portugal, France and Germany. In this context it is remarkable that Germany was the only country where the structural budget deficits have increased since the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact, while neighbouring countries such as Austria and the Netherlands which initially showed somewhat higher structural deficits than Germany have succeeded in removing the deficit; the Netherlands even attained a structural budget surplus.
In Table 3 . The benchmarks should be sufficiently low to provide a cyclical safety margin which allows the automatic fiscal stabilisers to work in recessions while keeping the actual budget deficit still below the 3 per cent reference value. The higher the sensitivity of the budget to the cycle and the higher the volatility of the economy, the higher will be the safety margin for the respective member country. -13 -
The safety margins which the European Commission has calculated and the resulting minimum benchmark deficits are shown in Table 4 4 .
The 5 The Commission emphasizes that the calculated benchmarks are minimum levels. Governments may well aim at achieving lower deficits or higher surpluses than shown by the benchmark levels in Table 4 , e.g. to provide an additional safety margin for unforeseen budgetary developments or to reduce the interest burden to prepare for ageing populations Cabral (1999) , own calculations. (European Commission 2001, p. 53-55) . Artis and Buti (2000) estimate the safety margin for unforeseen budgetary developments to be of the order of 0.5 to 1 per cent of GDP.
-15 -these countries aim at achieving a situation of budget balance or surplus by 2004. It could, however, support the view that for these countries there was relatively little pressure to proceed faster with respect to a deficit reduction because they considered the probability to exceed the threshold in case of a recession in 2001 as very low at the projected deficit ratios of 1-1 ½ per cent. However, this explanation is not fully satisfying. In Table 4 6 In this respect it is worthwhile to recall the early warning of the European Central Bank: "… at the beginning of the next century a number of important countries in the EU will be brought to a position from which it will be barely possible for them to withstand normal macroeconomic fluctuations without some risk of breaching the reference value for deficits" (ECB 1999, p. 59).
A second potential reason for why some countries have been less ambitious in reducing their deficit may be seen in the different probability of sanctions in case of an excessive deficit. Looking at the group of countries with the highest projected deficits, it is striking that they comprise the largest member countries of the Euro-area (Germany, France, Italy). Thus, one might advance the hypothesis that large countries have been less eager to reduce deficits because they expect that an eventual excessive deficit procedure would be applied less stringently for large countries than for small countries. The argument behind this would be that due to the different voting shares in the ECOFIN-Council it is more difficult to find a qualified majority for sanctions against a large country than for sanctions against a small country.
7 It is, however, difficult to empirically substantiate this hypothesis. First, it does not explain the relatively low effort by Portugal, which has only 5 votes in the ECOFIN-Council. Second, one has to take into consideration that Denmark, Sweden and the U.K. which do not belong to the Euro-area and are not subject to sanctions under the Stability Pact, have nevertheless pursued a very strict fiscal policy. There are no clear signs for a close link between the probability of facing sanctions and the ambition to reduce public deficits in the EU.
7 Decisions have to be taken by a qualified majority which is defined as two-thirds of a total of 87 votes. Germany, France and Italy have 10 votes each, while e.g. Ireland and Finland have only 3 votes (ECB 1999).
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The low ambition of some countries may also be attributed to concerns that major steps to reduce the budget deficits would have a negative effect on growth. Empirically, there is, however, little support for the hypothesis of a trade-off between deficit reduction and economic growth. Table 5 lists the EU countries by the amount of the improvement of structural balances in the period as privatisation or cuts of subsidies and social security benefits. The role of these factors in successful stabilisations has been emphasised in particular by Alesina and Perotti (1997) .
It is also worth noting that there is no indication for a trade-off between fiscal consolidation and institutional reform as presumed by Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1998) . They had expressed concern that cuts of fiscal deficits as a conse- Second, the member countries of the Euro-area have interpreted the term of a medium-term budget "close to balance or in surplus" in strict sense. They all project a balanced budget or a surplus for the middle of the decade. This suggests that they seek not only to provide a cyclical safety margin but also to contribute to a reduction of the interest burden.
Third, while all countries have been ambitious with respect to the medium-term budget, not all have shown the same ambition in the short run. Four countries (France, Germany, Italy and Portugal) still had sizeable deficits in the third year of the Stability Pact -both with respect to the actual and the structural budget.
The relatively low ambition of these countries can only partly be attributed to the requirement of lower cyclical safety margins or to a higher voting share in the ECOFIN-Council.
Fourth, the objection that the Stability Pact would prevent the functioning of the automatic stabilisers and result in a procylical fiscal policy has not been con- rates below the EU-average. The other seven countries even managed to achieve higher growth rates than in the period 1974-91 during which structural deficits had been built up.
-21 -One conclusion that one can draw from this is that countries which have not reached a position close to balance or in surplus should be required to base their stabulity programmes on reductions of the structural deficits by at least 0.5 percentage points per year. The objection that this would be too ambitious and lead to lower medium-run growth is not supported by previous consolidation experiences in the EU.
